Takaturn 2.0
  • Takaturn Phase 2 - Plug In feature upgrade - Yield Generation and UI Feature Enhancements
  • Takaturn on the blockchain
  • Takaturn Smart Contracts
  • Terminology
  • Takaturn 2.0 Enhancements
  • Yield Generation (YG)
  • Yield Generation In the context of Takaturn 2.0
  • Liquidity Provisioning in terms of crypto & Takaturn 2.0 explained
  • Impermanent Loss in the context of Takaturn 2.0
  • Factors affecting Yield Generation
  • Collateral (Security Deposit) Management
  • Turn Group possible Outcomes
  • Default in a Turn Group
  • Partial Withdrawal
  • Collateral Management
  • User Account Management Enhancements
  • Term Management Enhancements
  • The Next Steps
  • Appendix 1
    • Illustrations
  • Appendix 2
  • Appendix 3
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Appendix 1

Defaulting MP Beneficiary, Frozen MP and Expulsion

Expulsion is a direct consequence of participant’s negative payment behavior and could be exacerbated by extreme downward ETH price volatility. Meaning that if a participant neglects to ensure that their monthly contributions are paid on time, they could run the risk of expulsion from the relevant turn group. Shorter turn groups reduce this risk.

This type of behavior will be further complicated if ETH prices fall.

Factors requiring consideration when entering a Turn Group

  • Someone cannot claim the Money pot if s/he has less than 1.1X RCC. Should this happen, the Money pot will be frozen at the time that it is due to the appropriate beneficiary.

  • The frozen Money pot can be claimed once the beneficiary’s collateral is equal to or exceeds 1.1X RCC ( which means needing to pay a few more cycles or ETH price must go up)

  • The frozen Money pot will be used to pay for cycle contributions if the relevant beneficiary defaults and/or runs out of collateral.

  • The frozen money pot could consist of USDC and ETH (from defaulters). In case of default the order of liquidated holdings will be, firstly collateral security (ETH), secondly, frozen MP USDC will be transferred to beneficiaries in case of further default and finally any ETH in the MP.

  • Position of turn group participants has an impact on expulsion.

Points to note

  • MP collectible at collateral v RCC of ≥ 1.1 x

  • MP frozen at collateral v RCC of < 1.1 x

  • Expulsion at collateral v RCC of < 1 x

  • Ongoing default could lead to expulsion (in our examples below we assume that participants are serial defaulters, this is a worst case scenario. The probability of this manifesting is minimal)

The above checks are conducted monthly within smart contract algorithms.

We will not be factoring YG into the examples in order to avoid confusion.

Tracking user and term-specific yield: The Takaturn V2 system maintains records of each user's yield and the yield generated during each term. This information is used for accurate and fair distribution of yield among the users.

Assumption/s:

  1. ETH v USD : 1ETH = $2000

  2. 100 USDC per month contribution, money pot is 1000 USDC. Minimum ETH collateral deposit for beneficiary 1 is 1.5X, reducing algorithmically in subsequent periods.

  3. 1 USDC = 1 USD

For purposes of our discussions and illustrations in this section we will be using a random 10 participant turn group with a monthly contribution of $100 per participant. This is referred to as a $1000 MP, with each participant contributing through the turn term:

Position

Collateral as a multiple of of MP value

1

0.75

1500

1.5x

2

0.70

1400

1.4x

3

0.65

1300

1.3x

4

0.60

1200

1.2x

5

0.55

1100

1.1x

6

0.50

1000

1.0x

7

0.45

900

0.9x

8

0.40

800

0.8x

9

0.35

700

0.7x

10

0.30

600

0.6x

We will use the above set of data to simulate the conditions leading up to possible expulsion and freezing of a money pot.

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Last updated 1 year ago